

KEY AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY PLAN

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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This research project recommends the key and essential elements that should be included in a strategic level U.S. Government Interagency Plan for reconstruction and stabilization. The elements were derived from study of World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom post conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. Both reconstruction events were analyzed with respect to how the U.S. organized for post war operations, the command control arrangements and authorities granted to those charged with carrying out the mission and roles and responsibilities. In addition, the concept of operations were examined with respect to the desired end state, supporting goals and objectives to be achieved, the assumptions used in the plan, and how resources were expended. The research reveals that a critical juncture is reached early on during reconstruction and stabilization whereby the U.S. must deliver improvements to the foreign population or lose credibility and risk a long term process of rehabilitating the image and intentions of the U.S. presence in the country.

KEY AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY PLAN

The purpose of this paper is to list and describe the minimum key and essential elements for a United States Government Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization (R/S) Plan for consideration by the State Department (DoS) on behalf of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the United States Army War College. The suggested elements were chosen for a strategic level plan, approved by the President, that provides the overall objectives, broad instructions and authorities granted to the leader of an operational interagency team for execution. Each essential element was chosen after study of R/S operations in World War II (WW II) and post Operations Iraqi Freedom and the key components from each that provided for success, or the lack thereof that may have contributed to problems. The new Joint Forces Command "U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation" pamphlet provides the foundation definitions of reconstruction and stabilization. Reconstruction is defined as the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development. Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.¹ The key and essential elements of a strategic plan are: command and control, roles and responsibilities, and a concept of operation. A concept of operation is comprised of the underlying assumptions, the desired end state, supporting objectives and resource strategy. Armed with these key and essential elements, a U.S. interagency team would be ready

to organize, build supporting operational level plans and arrive in a foreign country with sufficient initial guidance to begin work and achieving the nation's goals.

In depth examination of every intervention undertaken by the U.S. would far exceed the imposed requirement limits for this paper. WW II and Iraq were selected as models as they represent two of the most encompassing, ambitious, and difficult R/S endeavors attempted by this country. The aim of this research paper is to produce an interagency plan, and not another military plan. Clearly the Department of Defense (DoD) can contribute a great deal of expertise and point to lessons learned, many the hard way, on what elements are key and essential to a plan. But throughout this endeavor, the author never lost site of the goal to produce elements of an interagency plan vice another military one.

The impetus for what a strategic level plan should accomplish came from a planning lesson learned by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf who led the Grenada invasion force in October 1983. On October 14, 1983 the decision was made that a possible evacuation of American citizens living in Grenada might be necessary due to increasing tensions on the island. Over the course of the next 10 days, Admiral Metcalf was given a team of land, air, and maritime forces from which to build a plan, none of whom were familiar with or had ever planned or exercised for military action against that country. The quantity and quality of information, intelligence and maps on Grenada was nearly non-existent, including sources at the national level. Terrain, opposing forces and indigenous reaction to an American invasion force as well as the location of American citizens on the island were for all intents and purposes unknown. Admiral Metcalf was notified he would lead this mission on October 17th with an execution date set for

October 25. In the interim period, numerous mission and military force changes increased the scope of the invasion. As the plan was carried out, severe interoperability problems emerged between the military services. For example, the inability for some units to directly communicate with each other via radio, the lack of service-specific expertise on Metcalf's planning staff, and surprises that occurred once troops began to land on the island because of the lack of intelligence. Despite these and other problems, the mission was a success.²

Admiral Metcalf later credited the mission's success to his command philosophy that it was his job to provide a plan to this divergent group of forces that explained 'what' he wanted them to do and left them to figure out the 'how' of making it work. From his vantage point as commander of the operation, he felt 'the six thousand mile screwdriver' was being applied to his headquarters from higher authorities. In response, he set up communications channels to satisfy higher headquarters' information needs, but down the chain of command he directed 'what' the execution elements were to do and left to their discretion 'how' to do them.³ The key and essential elements of the U.S. interagency R/S plan must direct the 'what' and leave the team to work plans for the 'how.'

Command and Control

The first essential element to discuss is that of command and control. Clear, defined and unambiguous authority best serves a team tasked with executing a R/S mission. Command and control must provide the operational leader and team two key attributes. First, the team needs to be able to make quick decisions, especially in the early phases of R/S operations. Second, the leader requires authority and control over

all facets of the mission. Regardless of the command and control relationship adopted, the primary result should be that all R/S team members, regardless of agency origin, understand who the decision maker is, accept the individual's authority, and work to support him or her.

The attribute of speed from decision to action is critical in the early stages of an R/S operation to gain the trust of the local population and to help meet expectations of those who need assistance. One lesson learned brought out during a U.S. Institute for Peace panel discussion, stressed the need to take advantage of the “golden hour” and speed R/S projects to the target population or risk creating disillusion and frustration among the people.⁴ As leader of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) which started R/S activities in Iraq following major combat operations, Jay Garner came away with the same impression. During the onset of R/S activities he believes the U.S. squandered the “honey moon period” when coalition forces were unable to speed needed reconstruction resources to areas with acute requirements.⁵ In addition, Garner stated decision speed and authority must go hand in hand.

An R/S team needs flexibility and authority to make changes on the ground rapidly and without relying on committee rule from U.S. Agencies. “As the organizational chain of command stood..., [the ground component commander] was always being pulled...from the military side and I was being pulled by the State Department, National Security Advisor, the administration or someone else.” This command arrangement made it difficult to build synergy of effort absent an organization that owned all the assets and could make rapid decisions based on developments in the field.⁶ The U.S.

WW II R/S command and control arrangement exemplifies a form of authority that offers a model for the interagency to consider.

“The most important” decision to successful European Theater R/S operations was “...assigning full control and responsibility for civil affairs and military government to military commanders.”⁷ Legislative, executive and judicial powers were granted to the commander who in turn governed through policies he issued to all occupied countries throughout Europe regardless of boundaries. The authority allowed for tailored solutions to problems that best fit local customs and traditions while preserving mission primacy from local civilian interference.⁸ By combining both combat and R/S assets under one organization, it solved the problem of prioritizing the flow of combat and R/S personnel and equipment into theater as the R/S teams did not control any ships, planes or vehicles.

Perhaps the ultimate example of clear and unambiguous authority in a post conflict environment is that of General Douglas MacArthur in Japan. He ruled absolute, and the results of his efforts were an unqualified success. By design, McArthur’s guidance came from a council made up of representatives from the U.S., Britain, and Russia, instructions from which he paid little attention. Instead he relied on a message from President Truman to “...exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on unconditional surrender.....your authority is supreme.”⁹ MacArthur relegated the Emperor from god-like status to a mere icon of Japanese history who could not even vote in elections, imposed limits on profits foreign businesses could remove from the country, and personally authored vast portions of what would become the new

Japanese constitution. He had authority to dissolve parliament, and faced down a threat from that very entity to resign en masse because of his decree that any person who belonged to previous right-wing political parties were ineligible to hold office. He preferred to allow the new legislature to collapse and rebuild it from scratch than acquiesce to any challenge to his authority.¹⁰ William J. Sebald, the Ambassador to Japan stated “Never before in the history of the United States had such enormous and absolute power been placed in the hands of a single individual”¹¹ and had it not been for MacArthur’s firm rule the entire R/S operation may have failed.¹²

MacArthur’s example does show a strong and unambiguous chain of command can yield success. However, unless there is a drastic change to the way the U.S. Government grants authorities and funds agencies, a direct command and control relationship between departments will be difficult to achieve.¹³ Therefore, in order to capitalize on decision speed in the early R/S phase and provide the field leader with clear authority, the U.S. interagency strategic plan should consider initially establishing a military government with DoD the sole agency in charge of civil affairs until security levels and a permissible environment are established. A military government provides the leader with a clear line of resources and authority to conduct all necessary operations. Once the R/S environment stabilizes, command and control would shift to another department, such as DoS who would take charge to conduct the longer term R/S tasks and programs required for success. The DoD as well as all other U.S. agencies would become subordinate to the agency leader in a “supported - supporting” relationship.

This command and control relationship has been developed over time between military services as a means of providing unity of effort in the absence of a formal command relationship. Borrowing from military doctrine, a supported commander is granted execution responsibility for orders and direction as set out by his or her higher authority, including the Secretary of Defense or the President. Supporting commanders assist the supported commander with resources and personnel required to accomplish mission tasks.¹⁴ The concept embodies the idea that the supported commander retains authority to employ supporting forces in pursuit of objectives and takes into consideration the “accepted practices,” or how the contributing agency’s personnel and resources are traditionally employed. There is no direct command and control authority of one agency over another, but personnel and resources sent to support the effort are directly under the authority of the supported organization or leader.¹⁵ Under this command arrangement, any agency could lead with all other agencies supporting the main effort.

An examination of R/S command and control relationships during Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates the problems and issues that arise from ambiguous command and control relationships. Command and control relationships between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by L. Paul Bremer, and the rest of the U.S. and coalition R/S teams was a point of friction and confusion. First, it was not clear whether the CPA was in fact an established and legitimate U.S. federal entity or whether the organization derived its authority from U.N. Resolution 1483.¹⁶ Second, the President issued an executive order which conveyed upon Bremer judicial, law making, and executive authority in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Further, Bremer was told he

would report to and provide advice through the Defense Secretary but expressly withheld any authority to control military forces providing security in Iraq.¹⁷ Two letters signed by the President described deployed interagency teams' relationship with Bremer as "...implementing partners or executing agents for programs and projects."¹⁸ A partnership implies consultation or perhaps decision by consensus, not a clear mandate for leadership.

Regardless of how one might interpret the intent behind and language of the Presidential instructions, Bremer never felt he possessed clear and unambiguous leadership authority over the agencies deployed with the CPA. He received a letter signed by the Secretary of Defense which stated that Central Command military commanders were to treat Bremer's direction as commander's intent which is defined by the DoD as "a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state."¹⁹ From a military standpoint, commander's intent provides guidance to subordinates in the absence of specific directions, it is not an order. The dilemma facing interagency leaders without expressed and recognized command and control authority is the inability to resolve disputes should the parties involved fail to reconcile the problem at hand. In such a situation, the only remedy is to refer the problem to the President of the United States, and there is little desire to take that step. Although both military forces and the CPA worked to attain the same goal Bremer "...was not in the chain of command with the military and that was a problem."²⁰

Roles and Responsibilities

Roles and responsibilities is the next key and essential element of an interagency plan and supports the command and control planning element by eliminating overlap,

reducing redundant and wasteful planning efforts, but also in aiding cooperation and appreciation between agencies.

Many agencies specialize in unique capabilities that together make up the elements of U.S. national power -- Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy, and Law Enforcement.²¹ However, overlaps exist between agencies and often one capability resides within more than one department. An effort is underway with all agencies to negotiate a memorandum of agreement on roles each will play in an R/S effort. For instance, the Department of Commerce provides weather expertise as well as frequency spectrum management and telecommunications capabilities via the National Telecommunications and Information Agency. Yet, Defense contains similar functions within the different services.²² Expertise in areas such as training police cadres, establishing or revising judicial procedures, and otherwise creating an investigative arm of government would seem to fall in the purview of the Departments of Justice, but those capabilities also reside in DoD, Homeland Security, and Treasury.²³ The R/S plan must provide for which agency is responsible to conduct specific tasks which will spread workload more equitably among Government agencies, provide leadership with greater flexibility for employing forces and decrease redundant planning efforts for all departments.

Even in the best of circumstances lines of responsibility blur as situations change on the ground. Another challenge exists in how and when to transfer authority and security operations from military to law enforcement agencies if major combat operations precede an R/S intervention.²⁴ Complex environments take on patchwork-like characteristics when R/S follows immediately behind combat. In Europe throughout

WW II, some areas were pacified while others were still contested by German forces. Civil affairs troops were operating in conjunction with and then independently from combat forces across the continent. A great deal of potential exists for confusion between war and peace as the transition occurs from shooting to rebuilding. German and friendly-country civilians were confused at times as to whether the civil affairs or combat units were in charge of their towns and areas.²⁵ In Iraq, basic lapses in coordination between Garner's ORHA and combat units left him without transportation or security as no coordination had occurred between the military and ORHA when the R/S team was to follow the ground force. "There was no plan for that. No U.S. agency had been tagged to provide the basics for us. Eventually [the Army] took on the task to provide vehicles and security."²⁶

Not only will planned roles and responsibilities assist team members on the ground, redundant planning efforts will be reduced. In WW II, British and U.S. planning staffs often worked independent of each other on the same R/S problem sets without knowing the other was working the same problem.²⁷ During the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, none of the agency-specific plans had been operationalized, that is to say, there was only a plan that existed on paper but had not been resourced with assets, personnel and procedures on how to execute it. Jay Garner felt State, Defense and especially Treasury Departments wrote quality plans that fit in the context of the agency that wrote them but when combined contradicted each other or went about the same activities in different ways. The result lacked unity of effort between agencies in the field and overlapped planning efforts for the same task.²⁸

Finally, the roles and responsibilities section of the plan will help alleviate misgivings and rivalries that seem to permeate the agencies and promote greater understanding of what each agency team brings to the table. Discussing the difficulty in today's environment to accomplish a fully integrated interagency plan, Bailey Hand from DoD Policy Branch stated "Basically you're going to find more and more attempts at coordination and even that at times can be a stretch. Just letting someone know you are [planning] can be a huge leap forward." As government agencies work to achieve the goal of a U.S. interagency team it will take time to build a sense of trust and appreciation for the skills and expertise each can provide.

Diana Putman, a career civil servant with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and a veteran of R/S missions in Somalia, Tunisia and Jordan said her military colleagues at the U.S. Army War College have a "fundamental misunderstanding of the reconstruction capabilities resident in the State Department," and describes the military culture as "insular." She concludes many military personnel do not understand or do not want to discover the capabilities and expertise DoS can add to the interagency effort.²⁹ DoS personnel perform missions in volatile regions of the world and many operate without direct protection from the military. Richard Smyth, a career DoS Foreign Service Officer, was in Afghanistan when Russian paratroops dropped into Kabul during the opening stages of Russia's invasion into Afghanistan: "I was doing foreign service work...at the time and sat there and had a conversation with a Russian soldier. He was speaking Dari and I was speaking Tajik but [the languages] were close enough we could understand each other." He was also stationed in Iraq from 1981 - 1984 during the Iran - Iraq war. As a veteran of austere assignments

around the globe he laments the disdain some military personnel seem to have for DoS personnel. As he's worked with the military on numerous occasions he said, "The flak vests issued to State personnel are usually old flimsy jackets--not at all like what the military is wearing. But if we complain, we're cowards and weak." Both Smyth and Putman pointed out the DoS has conducted R/S operations without the presence of U.S. military personnel in Cambodia during the Vietnam War and in East Timor where Australian troops provided security. "Every paper written [at the U.S. Army War College] on interagency starts off with the term 'interagency' meaning the DoD and 'everybody else'."³⁰

Unfortunately, these lessons had been learned during WW II. General Lucius Clay, while in Washington prior to taking on military governor duties in Germany stated "No one at the time advised me of the role of the State Department in occupation matters or of its relationship to military government, and I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it out."³¹ A more recent example occurred in Iraq in 2004. Battalion commander Jim Blackburn was assigned a member of USAID to his staff and was perplexed as to why the individual would be sent to his unit. Blackburn's initial thought was to find him a place for him to sit and not much else as Blackburn did not know what else to do with him. The situation continued like that for several weeks. As the two dialogued, Blackburn discovered the USAID member could bring money from the Iraqi government for R/S projects. At that point, the USAID member became an integral part of Battalion R/S plans. Blackburn said, "After I found out he had a source of funding for the projects I was trying to accomplish I got him involved in everything we were doing."³²

Concept of Operations

While roles and responsibilities saves time and effort, the concept of operations provides the context within which all team members execute the mission. The concept of operations lays out in broad outline the overall picture of the operation and captures the overarching desired end state and supporting objectives to the plan. From this element, all interagency players will gain a greater understanding of what resident capabilities their respective agency can contribute to the effort.³³ Several subcomponents make up the concept of operation and each will be discussed on how together they contribute.

The Desired End State

The defining statement of the entire plan is what set of conditions must exist to achieve the purpose for which the interagency team was sent in the first place.³⁴ This statement must be set forth by the President.³⁵ As the R/S plan is executed and operations unfold, the desired end state must be kept in front of all the players for the duration of the mission. It is the operational team leader's responsibility to focus all efforts to accomplish the end state so that victory can be declared.

The desired end state is often difficult to capture and is finally reached even at times through an iterative process between the President, senior government leaders and those tasked with achieving it. As obvious as it might seem today what post war Germany was supposed to look like, even as the WW II combat operations were underway in 1944 and 1945, leaders in the U.S. struggled with how to define post war Germany. Unconditional surrender was the military end state but left wanting what Germany herself should look like after the war. What did political victory mean and

what conditions needed to exist in order to declare that victory? One end state suggested in a memorandum from the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs dated September 4, 1944 suggested one idea. It proposed to eliminate all armed forces and associated weapons, dissolve the Nazi Party and its apparatus, censorship of the press, strip economic assets from conglomerates and distribute them to smaller entities and stated, “The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent on imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production.”³⁶

As it did for post-war Germany, the desired end state can change over time. While the U.S. considered whether to reverse German industrial and manufacturing capacity and ensure she was no longer a threat to Europe, Russia’s actions at the close of the war changed that thinking. As Russia captured Eastern Europe and the Korean War began, the desired end state for Germany was changed to revitalization and made part of a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union only five years after the end of WW II.³⁷

Objectives

Objectives serve three primary purposes for an interagency team. They provide building blocks to support the desired end state, focus for interagency team operational planning, and targets for resourcing decisions. Strategic level objectives also must be flexible and not put a straightjacket on the team in the field.³⁸

Operation Eclipse, the post-war plan for European R/S operations phased objectives over time which gave field executors some flexibility but at the same time may have been a source of conflict or confusion. Eclipse objectives issued to American forces were:

Phase I

1. Primary Disarmament of German Army
2. Enforce Surrender Terms
3. Establish Law and Order
4. Begin total disarmament of Germany
5. Redistribute Allied Forces into National Zones

Phase II

6. Relocate Displaced Persons
7. Catch War Criminals
8. Establish property and financial controls
9. Eliminate Nazism and Militarism
10. Preserve suitable civil administrations to accomplish all objectives³⁹

First, it's clear from examining the objectives that they focused on ensuring Germany's inability to resist or resume hostilities, by focusing on disarmament and enforcing surrender terms and law and order. The second phase began to focus on the state of Germany and the persons affected by the war. However, an intuitive analysis of Phase II objectives illustrates a dilemma faced by those charged with achieving them. The conflict comes when one is charged with *eliminating* Nazis party officials while still *preserving* suitable civil administrations to accomplish all objectives. WW II veteran

Robert Enkelmann, who fought with the 102d Ozark Infantry Division, was reassigned to an R/S team charged with rounding up Nazis party officials in small towns throughout Germany and finding suitable replacements to govern the area. He found success recruiting medical doctors to place in charge as they often were not required to join the political party.⁴⁰ This practice worked for local area management perhaps but managing larger cities or national level services becomes more complicated without preserving some expertise from those who previously ran civil administration activities. Stated objectives which are too specific or restrictive can work against achieving the overall goal. Planners and executors alike should carefully consider each objective as the plan is in development.

The U.S. changed one of its major objectives in coming to peace terms with Japan in 1945. Unconditional surrender terms were compromised when Japan refused to sign the Potsdam accords by insisting the Emperor remain in power. The U.S. opted to guarantee the Emperor's safety but stripped him of any capacity to influence or rule in Japanese political life. The long term effects from the decision perhaps worked to the U.S. advantage as the Emperor remained extremely popular among the Japanese populace despite the results of the war. Sparing the Emperor may have eased R/S operations after the war by preventing uprisings or revolt from executing the ruler.⁴¹

In contrast to WW II, Operation Iraqi Freedom R/S objectives did not exist in plan form at the end of the war.⁴² Post war planning occurred inside the DoD but was never transformed into an R/S set of objectives or published as part of an overall formal plan. The Defense Policy Office proposed a post-war military led force with DoS personnel working directly for military commanders which mirrored the WW II model. The idea

was to form an interagency cell that would develop the plan then deploy to implement it.⁴³ A list of objectives were written but never approved by the President. The objectives were:

1. Preserve Iraq territorial integrity and visibly improve quality of life
2. Iraq is seen as moving toward democratic institutions and is a model for the region
3. Coalition can continue global war on terror operations and destroy WMD
4. Obtain international participation in the R/S effort
5. Obtain support of Iraqi people
6. Obtain political support of international community
7. Place Iraqis in positions of authority as quickly as possible
8. Accomplish the above urgently⁴⁴ (some objectives were paraphrased for brevity)

The objectives appeared broad enough but a cursory analysis reveals some may have been beyond the capability of the interagency team to achieve such as obtaining international support and defining “urgent” accomplishment. Further, whether Iraq is “seen” as moving toward democratic institutions may or may not be as important as actually moving the government toward democracy regardless of outside interpretation. Perhaps describing a form of representative government, vice “democracy” may have been a more achievable objective depending on how planners defined democracy in this particular list of objectives. Further speculation on how these objectives may have appeared in final form or whether these pre-decisional objectives were valid is of limited value. However, the author felt it worth while to at least reveal the objectives as they

existed in the planning stage. The conclusion reached is that had an R/S plan been published prior to ORHA and CPA entering Iraq, early R/S operations may have been more effective.

Assumptions

The quality of stated objectives can depend on the accuracy of the assumptions underpinning the plan. When proven wrong, then the priority of the objectives or the actual objectives themselves may need to be changed. A definition and discussion on assumptions is important as they will most likely prove unavoidable. Also, assumptions may be a new concept to many interagency departments.⁴⁵ Assumptions allow a plan to go forward in the absence of facts.⁴⁶ Unpredictable and complex situations by definition mean there will be gaps in knowledge and assumptions are used as substitutes on which to base the plan until confirmed or disputed by facts. Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the Iraq plan and said, “You have to put up assumptions that are things that you either can’t control or can’t be controlled...some of them are external to the department so they have to be there so that other people [can see and plan for them].”⁴⁷

Assumptions must meet two critical criteria. First, one should only be used if it is underpinned by logic and realistic relative to the R/S operation, and it is essential to make one in order for the plan to be written.⁴⁸ For illustrative purposes, General Tommy Franks’ assumptions for the Iraq war are listed here as they existed during the August 2002 time frame. Only those with implications for R/S operations are listed here for brevity purposes:

1. Host nations in the region would be available in some fashion to permit at least the [U.S.] unilateral operation.

2. Some Iraq opposition groups would support the U.S. military inside Iraq or at least would provide some cooperation.

3. CENTCOM (DoD's Central Command military headquarters in charge the Iraq combat operations) would have at least a force level of 105,000 in the region before starting combat operations

4. The DoS would promote creation of a broad-based, credible provisional government as had been done in Afghanistan

5. Regional states would not interfere

6. The civilian reserve fleet could help transport troops and materiel⁴⁹

Assumptions should be challenged and the goal is for the plan to contain as few of them as the situation permits. All available efforts should be made to ascertain information that proves the assumption is in fact true or false. Some, however, will not lend themselves to resolution until the actual events begin to unfold. They serve as a feedback mechanism allowing those executing the plan to look back and make adjustments when an assumption turns out not to be true.⁵⁰ It should be expected that many assumptions will not prove true or only be partially correct and require action to adjust the plan accordingly.

As an example, the CPA and ORHA did indeed have assumptions that turned out false such as: R/S operations would require fighting oil fires, and there would be massive refugee flows and humanitarian crisis throughout the country. The fortunate aspect of these assumptions not coming to pass is it freed up resources to solve other

issues in the aftermath of combat. However, the level of violence that would be present in the R/S environment was not accurate. Garner's group assumed there would be significant retribution killings between Shia and Sunni Arabs. ORHA also foresaw the Kurds attempting to reclaim the parts of Kurdistan that had been "Arabized" by Saddam Hussein, as well as low level looting and criminal activity. However, he believed no assumption accounted for the level of warfare that ensued months after major combat operations ceased. "We knew there would be problems. We knew all those who had been oppressed were going to take some kind of reprisal action but I don't think we foresaw the magnitude it would take on."⁵¹ He went on to say, "Once assumptions begin to break apart, and they will, then you have to have flexibility on the ground with the leader to make changes instantly."⁵²

Resources

Perhaps the most difficult element for an interagency team to work with is resources. The difficulty stems from how money is appropriated to R/S programs and governing regulations on expenditures. The near universal preference for funding R/S operations from all persons interviewed for this paper is the desire for a central account of money appropriated for an interagency team. For Garner, an initial pot of \$2.2 billion existed but "the problem was I couldn't get my hands on it because OMB had tied it up so hard."⁵³ Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that \$1.6 billion existed in the form of frozen Iraqi funds set aside as a result of the 1991 Gulf War. Administrative 'red tape' kept the funds from easy access despite the fact they were earmarked for use in Iraq.⁵⁴

U.S. funds for reconstruction are generally placed in specific accounts which are governed by Congressional rules on how and what kind of projects the money can be used for. As this arrangement effects how money is appropriated at the strategic level it also impacts the execution level. Colonel Brian Drinkwine commanded a battalion in Iraq in 2004 and worked with USAID personnel to fund a project in his area of responsibility but found that after 60 days the funding stream stopped. He brought the issue to the USAID representative who informed him that the funds used for that particular type of project could only be expended for 60 days. From the military commander's perspective, the seed money was good, but he needed an enduring source of funds to continue the employment of Iraqi civilians. His project was frustrated and he faced a situation where he had to find another source of funds or break faith with the workers when they discovered after two months they would no longer receive a paycheck.⁵⁵

Resources are needed prior to commencement of R/S operations. Another problem comes in hiring contractors required for tasks. Garner related an instance where ORHA identified 16 contractors needed "on day one" but money to hire contractors only became available at the start of the war. When major combat operations ceased, the contractor was still in the process of hiring the team, giving them instructions and sending them through DoD qualification courses before the entering Iraq. By the time the process was complete, the contractors were not in Iraq until 4 months after major combat operations had ended. Most contractors are reluctant to hire the required personnel before funds are released since there is no guarantee the

contract will be let and the contractor would have to bear the cost of paying the personnel up to the point government funds were made available.⁵⁶

One option to work around the problems inherent in U.S. government funding practices is to place resourcing details in annexes or agency plans.⁵⁷ Each agency would be responsible to account for its own resource strategy much as it is practiced today. Despite the problems with this arrangement that have already been discussed, at least documenting agency funding strategies in the U.S. strategic plan would give the interagency team leader visibility into funds available and better inform all agencies how individual funding streams work. With this arrangement, at least some level of flexibility and overall oversight into funding efforts would be possible.

Fund distribution methods inherent in U.S. appropriation laws limit solutions for the team leader. However, resources are too critical not to include in the plan, regardless of how the funds are accounted for. Without some insight into available funds and how to access them, R/S operations are at best inefficient and ineffective and at worst come to a halt. As mentioned earlier, speed of R/S activities is critical particularly in the initial stages of an intervention and resource coordination is a key and essential component to that success.

Endnotes

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